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Theoretical foundation for a debtor friendly bankruptcy law in favour of creditors

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  • Philippe Frouté

    (LIPHA - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire d'Etude du Politique Hannah Arendt Paris-Est - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

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Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Frouté, 2007. "Theoretical foundation for a debtor friendly bankruptcy law in favour of creditors," Post-Print hal-02335906, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02335906
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-007-9033-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Philippe Aghion & Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, 1994. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, Restructuring, pages 215-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
    3. Maria Brouwer, 2006. "Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 5-20, July.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Laurent Vilanova, 1997. "La décision de prêt bancaire comme signal imparfait sur l'emprunteur," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(3), pages 219-246.
    6. Boyd, John H. & Prescott, Edward C., 1986. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 211-232, April.
    7. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    8. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2005. "Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty," ESSEC Working Papers DR 05005, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    9. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    10. Berlin, Mitchell & John, Kose & Saunders, Anthony, 1996. "Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and Financial Distress," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 889-919.
    11. Allan C. Eberhart & Lemma W. Senbet, 1993. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations and Risk Incentives for Financially Distressed Firms," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(3), Fall.
    12. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    13. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
    14. Wruck, Karen Hopper, 1990. "Financial distress, reorganization, and organizational efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 419-444, October.
    15. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    16. Altman, Edward I, 1984. "A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1067-1089, September.
    17. White, Michelle J, 1994. "Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 268-295, October.
    18. Jean-Daniel Guigou & Laurent Vilanova, 1999. "Les vertus du financement bancaire: fondements et limites," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 2(2), pages 97-133, June.
    19. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    20. repec:bla:econom:v:54:y:1987:i:215:p:279-88 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
    22. Mayer,Colin & Vives,Xavier (ed.), 1993. "Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521443975, September.
    23. Rajan, Raghuram & Winton, Andrew, 1995. "Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1113-1146, September.
    24. Mooradian, Robert M, 1994. "The Effect of Bankruptcy Protection on Investment: Chapter 11 as a Screening Device," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1403-1430, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises [Strategic default and bankruptcy law]," MPRA Paper 14366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Jaka Cepec & Mitja Kovac, 2016. "Carrots and Sticks as Incentive Mechanisms for the Optimal Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 79-103, June.
    3. Blazy, Régis & Martel, Jocelyn & Nigam, Nirjhar, 2014. "The choice between informal and formal restructuring: The case of French banks facing distressed SMEs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 248-263.
    4. Fien van Solinge & Beau Soederhuizen, 2023. "European Insolvency Law and Firm Leverage," CPB Discussion Paper 448, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    5. Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard, 2012. "(Un)secured debt and the likelihood of court-supervised reorganization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 45-61, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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