IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v26y2006i4p429-454.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

It takes two to tango: An empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting banks

Author

Listed:
  • Couwenberg, Oscar
  • de Jong, Abe

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Couwenberg, Oscar & de Jong, Abe, 2006. "It takes two to tango: An empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting banks," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-454, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:26:y:2006:i:4:p:429-454
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144-8188(07)00002-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41.
    2. Gorton, G. & Khan, J., 1992. "The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral, and Renegociation," RCER Working Papers 327, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    3. Bergstrom, Clas & Eisenberg, Theodore & Sundgren, Stefan, 2002. "Secured debt and the likelihood of reorganization," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 359-372, May.
    4. Oscar Couwenberg, 2001. "Survival Rates in Bankruptcy Systems: Overlooking the Evidence," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 253-273, November.
    5. Bigus, Jochen, 2002. "Bankruptcy law, asset substitution problem, and creditor conflicts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 109-132, August.
    6. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
    7. S. Abraham Ravid & S. Sundgren, 1998. "The Comparative Efficiency of Small-Firm Bankruptcies: A Study of the US and Finnish Bankruptcy Codes," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 98-054, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    8. Kevin M.J. Kaiser, 1996. "European Bankruptcy Laws: Implications for Corporations Facing Financial Distress," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 25(3), Fall.
    9. Couwenberg, Oscar, 2001. "Survival rates in bankruptcy systems : overlooking the evidence," Research Report 01E15, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    10. Paul Asquith & Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, 1994. "Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(3), pages 625-658.
    11. Gertner, Robert & Scharfstein, David, 1991. "A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1189-1222, September.
    12. Julian Franks & Oren Sussman, 2005. "Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 9(1), pages 65-96.
    13. Gilson, Stuart C., 1990. "Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders : Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 355-387, October.
    14. Franks, Julian R. & Torous, Walter N., 1994. "A comparison of financial recontracting in distressed exchanges and chapter 11 reorganizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 349-370, June.
    15. Michelle J. White, 1980. "Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 550-564, Autumn.
    16. Erik Berglöf & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1994. "Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1055-1084.
    17. Eisenberg, Theodore & Tagashira, Shoichi, 1994. "Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence from Japan," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 111-157, January.
    18. James, Christopher, 1995. "When Do Banks Take Equity in Debt Restructurings?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(4), pages 1209-1234.
    19. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    20. Mayer,Colin & Vives,Xavier (ed.), 1993. "Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521443975, November.
    21. Thorburn, Karin S., 2000. "Bankruptcy auctions: costs, debt recovery, and firm survival," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 337-368, December.
    22. Julian Franks & Oren Sussman, 2005. "Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 65-96, March.
    23. Erik Berglof & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1994. "Capital Structure with Multiple Investors," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0044, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX..
    24. repec:dgr:rugsom:01e15 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. S. Abraham Ravid & Stefan Sundgren, 1998. "The Comparative Efficiency of Small-Firm Bankruptcies: A Study of the US and Finnish Bankruptcy Codes," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 27(4), Winter.
    26. Gilson, Stuart C. & John, Kose & Lang, Larry H. P., 1990. "Troubled debt restructurings*1: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 315-353, October.
    27. Tashjian, Elizabeth & Lease, Ronald C. & McConnell, John J., 1996. "An empirical analysis of prepackaged bankruptcies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 135-162, January.
    28. Stefan Sundgren, 1998. "Does a Reorganization Law Improve the Efficiency of the Insolvency Law? The Finnish Experience," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-198, September.
    29. Manove, Michael & Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2001. "Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 726-744, Winter.
    30. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Robert J. Dijkstra & Michael G. Faure, 2011. "Compensating victims of bankrupted financial institutions: a law and economic analysis," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 19(2), pages 156-173, May.
    2. Hakenes, Hendrik & Bigus, Jochen, 2014. "Does Relationship Lending Require Opaque (and Conservative) Financial Reporting?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9934, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Angelo Baglioni & Luca Colombo & Paola Rossi, 2018. "Debt restructuring with multiple bank relationships," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1191, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    4. Ludovico Maria Cocco & Elisa Cavezzali & Ugo Rigoni & Giorgia Simion, 2024. "How does soft information on the causes of default affect debt renegotiation? The Italian evidence," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 45-89, March.
    5. Huang, Jiang-Chuan & Huang, Chin-Sheng & You, Chun-Fan, 2015. "Bank relationships and the likelihood of filing for reorganization," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 278-291.
    6. Huang, Jiang-Chuan & Huang, Chin-Sheng, 2011. "The effects of bank relationships on firm private debt restructuring: Evidence from an emerging market," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 113-125, January.
    7. Araujo, Luis & Minetti, Raoul & Murro, Pierluigi, 2021. "Relationship finance, informed liquidity, and monetary policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    8. Jiang-Chuan Huang & Chin-Sheng Huang & Hueh-Chen Lin, 2013. "Firm Debt Renegotiation, Reorganization Filing and Bank Relationships," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 393-422, December.
    9. Couwenberg, Oscar & Lubben, Stephen J., 2013. "Solving creditor problems in the twilight zone: Superfluous law and inadequate private solutions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 61-76.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. de Jong, A., 2004. "It Takes Two To Tango: an empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting banks," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2004-049-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    2. Dewaelheyns, Nico & Van Hulle, Cynthia, 2009. "Filtering speed in a Continental European reorganization procedure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 375-387, December.
    3. Marianna Succurro, 2012. "Bankruptcy systems and economic performance across countries: some empirical evidence," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 101-126, February.
    4. Michelle J. White, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law," NBER Working Papers 11536, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Franks, Julian & Sussman, Oren, 2003. "Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Marianna Succurro, 2008. "Bankruptcy Systems And Economic Performance Across Contries: Some Empirical Evidence," Working Papers 200801, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    7. Blazy, Régis & Martel, Jocelyn & Nigam, Nirjhar, 2014. "The choice between informal and formal restructuring: The case of French banks facing distressed SMEs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 248-263.
    8. Naohisa Goto & Konari Uchida, 2012. "How do banks resolve firms’ financial distress? Evidence from Japan," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 455-478, May.
    9. Hege, U. & Mella-Barral, P., 1999. "Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt," Other publications TiSEM d1806bd7-b34c-4249-b6fd-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Amanda Carmignani & Massimo Omiccioli, 2007. "Costs and benefits of creditor concentration: An empirical approach," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 645, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    12. Antje Brunner & Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2008. "Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(2), pages 415-442.
    13. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    14. Nicolae Stef, 2023. "Bankruptcy voting process and corporate reorganization," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 508-524, April.
    15. Couwenberg, O. & de Jong, A., 2007. "Costs and Recovery Rates in the Dutch Liquidation-Based Bankruptcy System," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2007-041-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    16. Dinev, Nikolay, 2017. "Voluntary Bankruptcy as Preemptive Persuasion," Economics Series 334, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    17. Agrawal, Ashwini & Gonzalez-Uribe, Juanita & Martinez-Correa, Jimmy, 2020. "Measuring the ex-ante incentive effects of bankruptcy reorganization procedures," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118908, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Nicola Gennaioli & Stefano Rossi, 2013. "Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 602-634.
    19. Simeon Djankov & Oliver Hart & Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Debt Enforcement around the World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1105-1149, December.
    20. Couwenberg, Oscar & Lubben, Stephen J., 2013. "Solving creditor problems in the twilight zone: Superfluous law and inadequate private solutions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 61-76.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:26:y:2006:i:4:p:429-454. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.