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Investitionsanreize, Koalitionsverhalten und Gläubigerkonflikte

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  • Jochen Bigus

    (Universität Hamburg)

Abstract

Summary The article focuses on conflicts of interest between senior and junior debt. When the senior creditor faces a default risk and a coalition among the entrepreneur and the senior creditor is possible, the may jointly choose a less risky, but inefficient investment policy, at the cost of the remaining creditor. The junior creditor may anticipate this problem and rations credit then. Projects with a positive net present value may not be undertaken (underinvestment). If the junior creditor can seize some private wealth from the entrepreneur (external collateral), the problems is mitigated. The coalition problems depends on the type of senior and junior debt. When there is a me-first-rule or when there is unsecured and subordinated debt with even lower priority, coalition problems may be more severe than in the case of secured and unsecured debt. Note however, that there also may be a coalition’s incentive to decrease risk when priority is due to the maturity rather than to the rank of claims.

Suggested Citation

  • Jochen Bigus, 2002. "Investitionsanreize, Koalitionsverhalten und Gläubigerkonflikte," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 317-342, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:54:y:2002:i:4:d:10.1007_bf03372681
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372681
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    G31; G32;

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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