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What is a good reputation? Career concerns with heterogeneous audiences

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  • Bar-Isaac, Heski
  • Deb, Joyee

Abstract

When an agent faces audiences with heterogeneous preferences, it is non-trivial to determine what a “good” reputation means, and the return to reputation can be a non-monotonic function. We illustrate this through standard IO examples, and discuss some implications for reputation-building in a simple two-period career concerns framework. We conclude by discussing other observations concerning the impact of heterogeneous audiences on reputation-building.

Suggested Citation

  • Bar-Isaac, Heski & Deb, Joyee, 2014. "What is a good reputation? Career concerns with heterogeneous audiences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 44-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:44-50
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2014.02.012
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    Cited by:

    1. Zegners, Dainis, 2017. "Building an Online Reputation with Free Content: Evidence from the E-book Market," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168293, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Frédéric Loss & Antoine Renucci, 2021. "Promotions, managerial project choice, and implementation effort," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 799-819, November.
    3. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Miriam Krausz & Shmuel Nitzan, 2018. "The effect of democratic decision-making on investment in reputation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 155-164, October.
    4. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Fake News," IZA Discussion Papers 11207, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Martin Richardson, 2021. "Of hired guns and ideologues: why would a law firm ever retain an honest expert witness?," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2021-678, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    6. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2015. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper’s news desk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(1), pages 77-93, September.
    7. Yasui, Yuta, 2021. "Controlling Fake Reviews," MPRA Paper 108177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Advertising as signal jamming," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 91-113.
    9. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reputation; Career concerns; Common agency; Cigarettes and alcohol;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General

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