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(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters

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  • Heski Bar-Isaac Jr.
  • Joyee Deb Jr.

Abstract

We present a model in which an agent takes actions to affect her reputation with two audiences with diverse preferences. This contrasts with standard reputation models that consider a homogeneous audience. A new aspect that arises is that different audiences may observe outcomes commonly or separately. We show that, if all audiences commonly observe outcomes, reputation concerns are necessarily efficient- the agent's per-period payoff in the long run is higher than in one-shot play. However, when audiences separately observe different outcomes, the result is the opposite. Therefore, the agent would prefer to deal with audiences commonly. If this is not possible, the second-best solution may be to forgo reputation with one audience and focus entirely on the other.

Suggested Citation

  • Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:4:p:293-325
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.293
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2023. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    2. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Deb, Joyee, 2014. "What is a good reputation? Career concerns with heterogeneous audiences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 44-50.
    3. Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2022. "Media access, bias and public opinion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    4. Mostafa Monzur Hasan & Ahsan Habib & Ruoyun Zhao, 2022. "Corporate reputation risk and cash holdings," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(1), pages 667-707, March.
    5. Kaveh Moghaddam & Thomas Weber & Pouya Seifzadeh & Sara Azarpanah, 2021. "Internal Reputation of the Firm: CEO Retention and Firm Market Performance," Corporate Reputation Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(4), pages 205-221, November.
    6. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2023. "Reputation and perverse transparency under two concerns," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    7. Liu, Yan, 2023. "Essays on credit rating agencies in China," Other publications TiSEM b54b3315-1185-48b8-aaf8-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Frédéric Loss & Antoine Renucci, 2021. "Promotions, managerial project choice, and implementation effort," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 799-819, November.
    9. Mohamed Mostagir & James Siderius, 2023. "Strategic Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 904-921, February.
    10. Wenming Xu & Yan Liu, 2021. "Does reputational capital affect credit rating agencies?: empirical evidence from a natural experiment in China," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 433-468, June.
    11. Dana, James D. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2015. "Do tying, bundling, and other purchase restraints increase product quality?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 142-147.
    12. Eraslan, Hulya & Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2017. "Information Gatekeeping and Media Bias," Working Papers 17-001, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    13. Zegners, Dainis, 2017. "Building an Online Reputation with Free Content: Evidence from the E-book Market," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168293, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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