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Symmetric regulation for competitive telecommunications

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  • Schankerman, Mark

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  • Schankerman, Mark, 1996. "Symmetric regulation for competitive telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-23, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:8:y:1996:i:1:p:3-23
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Access pricing and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
    2. Kenneth L. Judd, 1985. "Credible Spatial Preemption," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 153-166, Summer.
    3. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
    4. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
    2. Haring, John & Rohlfs, Jeffrey H., 1997. "Efficient competition in local telecommunications without excessive regulation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 119-131, June.
    3. Knieps, Günter & Zenhäusern, Patrick, 2009. "Stepping stones and access holidays: The fallacies of regulatory micro-management," Discussion Papers 123, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    4. Seyed Reza Mirnezami & Amin Mohseni Cheraghlou, 2022. "Wind Power in Iran: Technical, Policy, and Financial Aspects for Better Energy Resource Management," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-18, April.
    5. Koski, Heli, 2002. "The Impacts of Regulatory Reform on the Global Telecommunications Sector," Discussion Papers 649, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    6. James Alleman & Gary Madden & Scott Savage, 2000. "Trade imbalance in international message telephone services," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(10), pages 1311-1321.
    7. Fraquelli, Giovanni & Vannoni, Davide, 2000. "Multidimensional performance in telecommunications, regulation and competition: analysing the European major players," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 27-46, March.
    8. Jaison Abel & Michael Clements, 2001. "Entry under Asymmetric Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(2), pages 227-242, September.
    9. Juan J. Montero, 2019. "Asymmetric regulation for competition in European railways?," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 20(2), pages 184-201, June.
    10. Lehr, William H. & Chapin, John M., 2010. "On the convergence of wired and wireless access network architectures," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 33-41, March.

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