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Optimal Capital Allocation Using RAROC(tm) and EVA

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  • Zechner, Josef
  • Stoughton, Neal

Abstract

This Paper analyses firms? capital allocation decisions when optimal capital structure is linked to the risk of underlying assets and when equity capital is costly and cannot be raised instantaneously. In the model, division managers receive private information and authority is delegated to them over risky project choices. The optimal mechanisms are related to EVA compensation and RAROC performance measurement systems. In the optimal mechanism, position limits will be employed but are not always completely utilized. Hurdle rates reflect capital allocation through a division-specific capital structure. In the multidivisional context the optimal capital allocation mechanism incorporates valuable externalities leading to overall firm EVA maximization.

Suggested Citation

  • Zechner, Josef & Stoughton, Neal, 2004. "Optimal Capital Allocation Using RAROC(tm) and EVA," CEPR Discussion Papers 4169, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4169
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial institutions; Banking; Capital budgeting; Investment policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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