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Ambiguous language and common priors

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  • Halpern, Joseph Y.
  • Kets, Willemien

Abstract

Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpreted in multiple ways. Using a framework that distinguishes between the language in which statements are made and the interpretation of statements, we demonstrate that, unlike in the case where there is no ambiguity, players may come to have different beliefs starting from a common prior, even if they have received exactly the same information, unless the information is common knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Halpern, Joseph Y. & Kets, Willemien, 2015. "Ambiguous language and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 171-180.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:171-180
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Christiane Baumeister & James D. Hamilton, 2019. "Structural Interpretation of Vector Autoregressions with Incomplete Identification: Revisiting the Role of Oil Supply and Demand Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(5), pages 1873-1910, May.
    2. Grant, Simon & Jude Kline, J. & Quiggin, John, 2018. "Contracting under uncertainty: A principal–agent model with ambiguity averse parties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 582-597.
    3. Baumeister, Christiane & Hamilton, James, 2017. "Structural Interpretation of Vector Autoregressions with Incomplete Identification: Revisiting the Role of Oil Supply and Deman," CEPR Discussion Papers 12532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ambiguous language; Common prior; Agree to disagree; Harsanyi doctrine;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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