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Efficient Sequential Assignments with Randomly Arriving Multi-Item Demand Agents

Author

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  • Dinard van der Laan
  • Zaifu Yang

Abstract

A seller has several heterogeneous indivisible items like tickets to sell over time before a deadline. These items become worthless after the deadline. Buyers arrive sequentially and randomly and have their own private valuations over items. Each buyer may acquire more than one item. We formulate this as an incentive compatible revenue maximization problem and characterize optimal allocation policies and derive various properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Dinard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2019. "Efficient Sequential Assignments with Randomly Arriving Multi-Item Demand Agents," Discussion Papers 19/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:19/13
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Revenue Maximization; Random and Sequential Assignment; Heterogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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