Multiagent Mechanism Design Without Money
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DOI: opre.2018.1820
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- Liang, Yong & Sun, Peng & Tang, Runyu & Zhang, Chong, 2023. "Efficient resource allocation contracts to reduce adverse events," Other publications TiSEM 0bcf44d9-d0ac-4231-beaf-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- K. Drakopoulos & R. S. Randhawa, 2021. "Why Perfect Tests May Not Be Worth Waiting For: Information as a Commodity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(11), pages 6678-6693, November.
- Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & Vahideh Manshadi, 2023.
"Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion,"
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- Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & Vahideh Manshadi, 2020. "Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion," Papers 2005.07253, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Moise Blanchard & Patrick Jaillet, 2024. "Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Resource Allocation Without Monetary Transfers," Papers 2408.10066, arXiv.org.
- Jacquillat, Alexandre & Vaze, Vikrant & Wang, Weilong, 2022. "Primary versus secondary infrastructure capacity allocation mechanisms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 303(2), pages 668-687.
- Combe, Julien & Nora, Vladyslav & Tercieux, Olivier, 0. "Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
- Ezzat Elokda & Saverio Bolognani & Andrea Censi & Florian Dorfler & Emilio Frazzoli, 2022. "A self-contained karma economy for the dynamic allocation of common resources," Papers 2207.00495, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
- Shivam Gupta & Wei Chen & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2023. "Three Years, Two Papers, One Course Off: Optimal Nonmonetary Reward Policies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 2852-2869, May.
- Th`anh Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym & Shai Vardi, 2023. "Dynamic Combinatorial Assignment," Papers 2303.13967, arXiv.org.
- Julien Combe & Vladyslav Nora & Olivier Tercieux, 2021. "Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms," Working Papers 2021-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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Keywords
dynamic mechanism design; social efficiency; multiagent games; resource allocation without money;All these keywords.
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