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Tie-Breaking in Games of Perfect Information

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  • Tranaes, Torben

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  • Tranaes, Torben, 1998. "Tie-Breaking in Games of Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 148-161, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:22:y:1998:i:1:p:148-161
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Geir B. Asheim, 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 427-443.
    2. Ebbe Hendon & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranæs, 1994. "Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 55-77, December.
    3. Bennett, E. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Demand commitment bargaining : The case of apex games," Discussion Paper 1990-62, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Nalebuff, B. & Shubik, M., 1988. "Revenge And Rational Play," Papers 138, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    5. Barry O'neill, 1986. "International Escalation and the Dollar Auction," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(1), pages 33-50, March.
    6. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Is There a Hold‐up Problem?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 475-494, October.
    2. Poulsen, Anders U., 2004. "On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 233-243, March.
    3. Daniel Barron & Yingni Guo, 0. "The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 136(1), pages 471-504.

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