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How Ostrom's design principles apply to large‐scale commons: Cooperation over international river basins

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  • Geiguen Shin

Abstract

Many conventional studies on common‐pool resources (CPRs) have examined the governance of local resources such as fisheries, forests, grazing systems, irrigation systems, agriculture, water resources, and land tenure. However, a limited selection of recent studies has been interested in large‐scale commons such as climate change, air pollution, and transboundary disputes. Despite Ostrom's design principles (DPs) providing a robust framework for solving CPR problems, there have been relatively few empirical challenges examining the effect of DPs on CPRs, especially in the large‐scale commons. This paper examines how Ostrom's DPs are applied to international commons that may cause complicated disputes among states. The case being studied is international rivers as international commons. Based on binary logit analysis, this research found that four of Ostrom's DPs—clear boundary, operational rules, monitoring system, and multi‐level governance—are positively associated with success in managing the international river commons (IRCs) as a CPR. Additionally, the results from fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) partially indicate that the co‐occurrence of monitoring, conflict mechanisms, and multi‐level governance would lead to more successful IRCs. 许多关于公共池塘资源（CPRs）的传统研究分析了地方资源的治理，例如渔业、林业、放牧系统、灌溉系统、农业、水资源和土地使用权。不过，近期鲜有研究聚焦于大型公共资源的治理，例如气候变化、空气污染和跨边界争端。尽管奥斯特罗姆的设计原则（DPs）为解决CPR问题提供了稳健框架，但分析DPs对CPRs产生的效果、尤其针对大型公共资源的实证研究相对较少。本文分析了奥斯特罗姆的设计原则如何应用于国际公共资源，后者可能造成国与国之间的复杂争端。将国际河流作为国际公共资源进行案例研究。基于二元logit分析，本研究发现，奥斯特罗姆的设计原则中有四项与成功管理国际河流这一公共资源（IRCs）呈正相关，这四项原则分别是：清晰边界、操作性规则、监督系统和多层治理。此外，模糊集定性比较分析（QCA）部分表明，监督、冲突机制和多层治理的共同出现将导致更为成功的IRCs。 Muchos estudios convencionales sobre recursos de uso común (CPR) han examinado la gobernanza de los recursos locales como la pesca, los bosques, los sistemas de pastoreo, los sistemas de riego, la agricultura, los recursos hídricos y la tenencia de la tierra. Sin embargo, una selección limitada de estudios recientes se ha interesado en bienes comunes a gran escala como el cambio climático, la contaminación del aire y las disputas transfronterizas. A pesar de que los principios de diseño (PD) de Ostrom proporcionan un marco sólido para resolver problemas de CPR, ha habido relativamente pocos desafíos empíricos que examinen el efecto de los PD en los CPR, especialmente en los bienes comunes a gran escala. Este documento examina cómo se aplican los PD de Ostrom a los bienes comunes internacionales que pueden causar disputas complicadas entre los estados. El caso que se estudia son los ríos internacionales como bienes comunes internacionales. Basado en el análisis logit binario, esta investigación encontró que cuatro de los DP de Ostrom (límites claros, reglas operativas, sistema de monitoreo y gobernanza multinivel) están asociados positivamente con el éxito en la gestión de los recursos comunes de los ríos internacionales (IRC) como CPR. Además, los resultados del Análisis Comparativo Cualitativo (QCA) de conjunto difuso indican parcialmente que la coexistencia del monitoreo, los mecanismos de conflicto y la gobernanza multinivel conducirían a CRI más exitosos.

Suggested Citation

  • Geiguen Shin, 2022. "How Ostrom's design principles apply to large‐scale commons: Cooperation over international river basins," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 39(5), pages 674-697, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:39:y:2022:i:5:p:674-697
    DOI: 10.1111/ropr.12457
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