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Rules and rewards in the age of sail: a reply

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  • Allen, Douglas W.

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  • Allen, Douglas W., 2003. "Rules and rewards in the age of sail: a reply," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 212-220, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:40:y:2003:i:2:p:212-220
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Allen, Douglas W, 1998. "Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 45-66, January.
    2. Allen, Douglas W., 2002. "The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 204-231, April.
    3. Benjamin, Daniel K. & Thornberg, Christopher F., 2003. "Comment: Rules, monitoring, and incentives in the age of sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 195-211, April.
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