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Principle-agent problems in the French slave trade: the case of Rochelais Armateurs and their agents, 1763-1792

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  • Forestier, Albane

Abstract

La Rochelle, the fourth largest slaving port in France in the eighteenth-century, is used as a case study in the application of agency theory to long-distance trade. This analysis explores an area not accounted for in the literature on French commercial practices. Being broadly couched in a New Institutionalist framework, this study explores the formal and informal institutions designed to curb agency problems, and emphasizes the ex-post strategies such as social rewarding, to which little attention is usually paid. It also finds reputation-effect strategies were efficiently combined with a well-operating legal system. It subsequently challenges the traditional dichotomy between societies where personal links dominated the economy and modern societies where business links are predominantly impersonal. As a result, this empirical analysis leads to a reappraisal of private ordering as opposed to legal centralism and calls for more theoretical research.

Suggested Citation

  • Forestier, Albane, 2005. "Principle-agent problems in the French slave trade: the case of Rochelais Armateurs and their agents, 1763-1792," Economic History Working Papers 22478, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:wpaper:22478
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Price & Warren Whatley, 2021. "Did profitable slave trading enable the expansion of empire?: The Asiento de Negros, the South Sea Company and the financial revolution in Great Britain," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 15(3), pages 675-718, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N0 - Economic History - - General
    • B1 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925
    • R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe

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