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Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain

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  • Douglas W. Allen

Abstract

Prior to the 19th century virtually all European civil appointments were made through outright sale or patronage, and the offices were effectively private property. During the first half of the 19th century almost all of these offices converted to professional bureaucracies with salaried employees. This paper explains the choice over purchase and patronage prior to 1800, and the later transition to professions, using the NIE hypothesis that the crown was interesting in maximizing the value of its offices, and therefore, its own treasury. This hypothesis is tested by examining three branches of the British civil service: the military, judiciary, and treasury.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas W. Allen, 2005. "Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(1), pages 57-79, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200503)161:1_57:ppapia_2.0.tx_2-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Allen, Douglas W, 1998. "Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 45-66, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Crettez, Bertrand & Deffains, Bruno & Musy, Olivier & Tallec, Ronan, 2020. "State Capacity, Legal Design and the Venality of Judicial Offices," MPRA Paper 105009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Habib, Michel, 2015. "Multifaceted Transactions, Incentives, and Organizational Form," CEPR Discussion Papers 10432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Touria Jaaidane & Sophie Larribeau, 2024. "State Capacity in Seventeenth-Century France: The Role of the Intendants," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2024-06, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    4. Allen, Douglas W., 2009. "A theory of the pre-modern British aristocracy," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 299-313, July.
    5. Noel D., Johnson & Mark, Koyama, 2012. "Standardizing the fiscal state: cabal tax farming as an Intermediate Institution in early-modern England and France," MPRA Paper 40403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Touria Jaaidane & Olivier Musy & Ronan Tallec, 2023. "Rent-seeking, reform, and conflict: French parliaments at the end of the Old Regime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 249-275, March.
    7. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2014. "Tax farming and the origins of state capacity in England and France," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 1-20.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation

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