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Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions

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  • Allen, Douglas W

Abstract

For several hundred years European armies staffed their officer corps through a system of purchase. Different ranks had different prices, and as officers moved through the ranks they would sell one commission in order to purchase the next. This basic observation, along with the large sums paid, seem incongruous with twentieth-century views on military organization. This article argues that the system was efficient in that it solved a selection problem and provided appropriate incentives. It is argued that the internal structure, methods of payment, differences across countries and military branches, and the final collapse of the system are all consistent with this hypothesis. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Douglas W, 1998. "Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 45-66, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:45-66
    DOI: 10.1086/468013
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:ereveh:v:24:y::i:4:p:696-715. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ennio Piano, 2020. "Coase Goes to War: Contract Choice on the Battlefield," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 1001-1023.
    3. Douglas W. Allen, 2005. "Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(1), pages 57-79, March.
    4. Ivan Ermakoff, 2011. "Patrimony and Collective Capacity," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 636(1), pages 182-203, July.
    5. Piano, Ennio E. & Rouanet, Louis, 2020. "Desertion as theft," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 169-183, April.
    6. Allen, Douglas W., 2002. "The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 204-231, April.
    7. Garrett Ryan Wood, 2022. "The organization of volunteer battalions in Ukraine," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 115-134, June.
    8. Yang, Der-Yuan, 2008. "On the elements and practices of monitoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 654-666, March.
    9. Ennio E. Piano & Louis Rouanet, 2020. "Economic calculation and the organization of markets," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 331-348, September.
    10. Allen, Douglas W., 2003. "Rules and rewards in the age of sail: a reply," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 212-220, April.
    11. Ennio E Piano & Byron B Carson, 2020. "Scalp-taking," Rationality and Society, , vol. 32(1), pages 40-66, February.

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