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A theory of the pre-modern British aristocracy

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  • Allen, Douglas W.

Abstract

Between c. 1550 -c. 1880, a small group of individuals ruled England and oversaw her transformation from a small country to the British Empire--and in the process they became exceedingly wealthy. Known as aristocrats, their unusual lifestyles were the antithesis of modern secular values. Today aristocrats are often viewed as a hindrance to pre-modern growth and development because they appeared to operate so inefficiently. This paper argues that the aristocrats efficiently provided the valuable service of "trustworthy servant", by investing their wealth in hostage capital. This theory explains terms of entry and exit out of the aristocracy, the strict family settlement, their education patterns, extravagant lifestyle, and their ultimate voluntary retreat from power.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Douglas W., 2009. "A theory of the pre-modern British aristocracy," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 299-313, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:46:y:2009:i:3:p:299-313
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Allen, Douglas W., 2002. "The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 204-231, April.
    6. Lee Soltow, 1968. "Long-Run Changes in British Income Inequality," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 21(1), pages 17-29, April.
    7. Douglas W. Allen & Yoram Barzel, 2007. "The Evolution of Criminal Law and Police," Working Papers UWEC-2008-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    8. Yoram Barzel, 2000. "Property rights and the evolution of the state," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 25-51, March.
    9. Douglas W. Allen, 2005. "Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(1), pages 57-79, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paula Eugenia Gobbi & Marc Goñi, 2020. "Childless Aristocrats. Inheritance and the extensive margin of fertility," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/316217, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Marc Goñi, 2023. "Landed elites and education provision in England: evidence from school boards, 1871-99," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 125-171, March.
    3. Vincent Geloso & Louis Rouanet, 2023. "Ethnogenesis and statelessness," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 377-407, June.
    4. Acheson, Graeme G. & Campbell, Gareth & Turner, John D., 2015. "Who financed the expansion of the equity market? Shareholder clienteles in Victorian Britain," QUCEH Working Paper Series 15-07, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.

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