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A local flexibility market mechanism with capacity limitation services

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  • Heinrich, Carsten
  • Ziras, Charalampos
  • Jensen, Tue V.
  • Bindner, Henrik W.
  • Kazempour, Jalal

Abstract

Local flexibility markets have a substantial potential to unlock the flexibility of distributed energy resources in the distribution level. Capacity limitation services have been perceived as one of the most appealing products to be traded in these markets. This work argues why classical market-clearing and pricing mechanisms such as pay-as-bid, uniform pricing and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) are not compatible with a market that trades capacity limitations. As a solution, we propose a local flexibility market mechanism which is built upon an adapted VCG-based auction. The mechanism achieves a trade-off among various desirable economic properties, including budget-balancedness, incentive-compatibility and stability. The suitability of the proposed mechanism is illustrated using a case study which is based on a real medium voltage feeder, located on the Danish island of Bornholm. Results show that aggregators and the distribution system operator benefit from the trade of capacity limitation services. We eventually conclude by providing a set of policy recommendations for the real-life operation of such a market.

Suggested Citation

  • Heinrich, Carsten & Ziras, Charalampos & Jensen, Tue V. & Bindner, Henrik W. & Kazempour, Jalal, 2021. "A local flexibility market mechanism with capacity limitation services," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:156:y:2021:i:c:s0301421521002056
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112335
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    2. Lind, Leandro & Chaves-Ávila, José Pablo & Valarezo, Orlando & Sanjab, Anibal & Olmos, Luis, 2024. "Baseline methods for distributed flexibility in power systems considering resource, market, and product characteristics," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    3. Hennig, Roman J. & de Vries, Laurens J. & Tindemans, Simon H., 2024. "Risk vs. restriction—An investigation of capacity-limitation based congestion management in electric distribution grids," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    4. Hermann, Alexander & Jensen, Tue Vissing & Østergaard, Jacob & Kazempour, Jalal, 2022. "A complementarity model for electric power transmission-distribution coordination under uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 299(1), pages 313-329.
    5. Tong, Ziqiang & Mansouri, Seyed Amir & Huang, Shoujun & Rezaee Jordehi, Ahmad & Tostado-Véliz, Marcos, 2023. "The role of smart communities integrated with renewable energy resources, smart homes and electric vehicles in providing ancillary services: A tri-stage optimization mechanism," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 351(C).
    6. Potenciano Menci, Sergio & Valarezo, Orlando, 2024. "Decoding design characteristics of local flexibility markets for congestion management with a multi-layered taxonomy," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 357(C).
    7. Jadhav, Ashok M. & Abhyankar, Abhijit R., 2022. "Emergence of distribution system operator in the Indian power sector and possible way ahead," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    8. Elias Carayannis & Pantelis Kostis & Hasan Dinçer & Serhat Yüksel, 2022. "Balanced-Scorecard-Based Evaluation of Knowledge-Oriented Competencies of Distributed Energy Investments," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(21), pages 1-23, November.

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