Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms
[Optimal Execution of Portfolio Transactions]
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- Samuel Antill & Darrell Duffie, 2017. "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 24146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Duffie, Darrell & Antill, Samuel, 2018. "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms," Research Papers 3623, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Duffie, Darrell & Antill, Samuel, 2017. "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms," Research Papers repec:ecl:stabus:3623, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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Cited by:
- Bernales, Alejandro & Ladley, Daniel & Litos, Evangelos & Valenzuela, Marcela, 2021. "Dark trading and alternative execution priority rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118866, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- de Roure, Calebe & Mönch, Emanuel & Pelizzon, Loriana & Schneider, Michael, 2019.
"OTC discount,"
Discussion Papers
42/2019, Deutsche Bundesbank.
- de Roure, Calebe & Mönch, Emanuel & Pelizzon, Loriana & Schneider, Michael, 2021. "OTC discount," SAFE Working Paper Series 298, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2021.
- Rohit Lamba, 2022. "Efficiency with(out) intermediation in repeated bilateral trade," Papers 2202.04201, arXiv.org.
- Daniel Chen & Darrell Duffie, 2021.
"Market Fragmentation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(7), pages 2247-2274, July.
- Daniel Chen & Darrell Duffie, 2020. "Market Fragmentation," NBER Working Papers 26828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chen, Daniel & Duffie, Darrell, 2020. "Market Fragmentation," Research Papers 3854, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Zhu, Jianchang & Sun, Xuchu & Li, Tangrong, 2024. "Execution uncertainty of dark pools and portfolio balance," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism design; Price impact; Size discovery; Allocative efficiency; Workup; Dark pool; Market design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
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