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Imperfections in labor markets and the scope of the firm

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  • Novos, Ian E.

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  • Novos, Ian E., 1995. "Imperfections in labor markets and the scope of the firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 387-410, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:13:y:1995:i:3:p:387-410
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-380, October.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    5. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
    6. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    7. Prescott, Edward C & Visscher, Michael, 1980. "Organization Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 446-461, June.
    8. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
    2. Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2016. "Strategic Shirking: A Theoretical Analysis Of Multitasking And Specialization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(2), pages 507-532, May.
    3. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    4. Novos, Ian E., 2000. "Internal and external labor markets and the scope of the firm," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 541-563, March.
    5. Jonathan R. Peterson, 2023. "Employee bonding and turnover efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 223-244, January.
    6. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Li, Jin, 2013. "Job mobility, wage dispersion, and technological change: An asymmetric information perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 105-126.

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