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Priming ideology I: Why do presidential elections affect U.S. judges

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  • Chen, Daniel L.

Abstract

Politicians’ behavioral changes as an election nears have typically been attributed to the incentive effects of an election. I document that behavioral changes can occur even for unelected judges, using data from 1925 to 2002 on U.S. appellate judges, who are appointed for life. Exploiting monthly campaign ads in judges’ states of residence, dissents increase with campaign advertisements in states where judges reside. Elections can explain 23 % of all dissents. I rule out a number of incentive-based explanations. Topic of dissents, replication in concurrences (disagreement about reasoning), and placebo checks using milestones of case development support a transient priming mechanism. If elite U.S. judges are in fact susceptible to priming via the partisan nature of electoral cycles, then highly trained individuals may be susceptible to other forms of priming regardless of their professional commitments to be unbiased.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Daniel L., 2024. "Priming ideology I: Why do presidential elections affect U.S. judges," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:169:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124001648
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104835
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judicial decision making; Salience; Identity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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