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Electoral Sentencing Cycles

Author

Listed:
  • David Abrams

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Roberto Galbiati

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Emeric Henry

    (Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Arnaud Philippe

    (University of Bristol [Bristol])

Abstract

We add to our understanding of the optimal method of judicial selection by exploiting an unusual feature in North Carolina: judges rotate location every six months. This allows us to identify the existence and source of sentencing variation over the electoral cycle. We show that when elections approach, felony sentences rise. This increase is found exclusively when judges are sentencing in their district of election, and only when elections are contested. When judges hear cases outside their home district, sentences do not significantly vary over the electoral cycle. Our results show that electoral sentencing cycles can be explained by strategic sentencing by judges in an attempt to please voters. The unique setting allows us to reject alternative behavioral or contextual explanations for the rise in sentences as elections approach. (JEL K42)

Suggested Citation

  • David Abrams & Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Arnaud Philippe, 2023. "Electoral Sentencing Cycles," Post-Print halshs-03792215, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03792215
    DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewab037
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03792215
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/12b1pd86do8s6p35b4jqn66t0p is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Claire S. H. Lim & James M. Snyder Jr. & David Strömberg Jr., 2015. "The Judge, the Politician, and the Press: Newspaper Coverage and Criminal Sentencing across Electoral Systems," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 103-135, October.
    3. David Abrams & Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Arnaud Philippe, 2022. "When in Rome... On Local Norms and Sentencing Decisions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 700-738.
    4. Tabarrok, Alexander & Helland, Eric, 1999. "Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 157-188, April.
    5. Christian Dippel & Michael Poyker, 2019. "How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing?," NBER Working Papers 25716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati & Francesco Sobbrio, 2020. "The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(6), pages 3305-3336.
    7. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 247-263, April.
    8. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dippel, Christian & Poyker, Michael, 2021. "Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 645-659.
    2. Chika O. Okafor, 2021. "Prosecutor Politics: The Impact of Election Cycles on Criminal Sentencing in the Era of Rising Incarceration," Papers 2110.09169, arXiv.org.
    3. Timothy Frye & John Reuter & David Szakonyi, 2012. "Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace," HSE Working papers WP BRP 08/PS/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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