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Empirical Evidence on a Special-Interest-Group Perspective to Antitrust

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  • Delorme, Charles D, Jr
  • Frame, W Scott
  • Kamerschen, David R

Abstract

While the antitrust laws claim to serve the public interest, they are susceptible to the influence of special-interest groups as are any public policies. This paper extends the empirical literature regarding the special-interest theory of antitrust. The authors' additional empirical evidence addresses some of the shortcomings in previous approaches. In particular, they conduct a more rigorous statistical examination. This paper separates two crucial issues. First, what happened to prices and output from 1880 to 1900, prior to and following passage of the Sherman Act in 1890? Second, what do these empirical results mean for the origin, history, and development of antitrust? Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Delorme, Charles D, Jr & Frame, W Scott & Kamerschen, David R, 1997. "Empirical Evidence on a Special-Interest-Group Perspective to Antitrust," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 317-335, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:92:y:1997:i:3-4:p:317-35
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Geloso & Raymond J. March, 2021. "Rent seeking for madness: the political economy of mental asylums in the United States, 1870 to 1910," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 375-404, December.
    2. Hüschelrath, Kai, 2008. "Is it Worth all the Trouble? The Costs and Benefits of Antitrust Enforcement," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-107, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Callais, Justin T & Geloso, Vincent, 2023. "The political economy of lighthouses in antebellum America," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

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