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Economic effects of voluntary religious castration on the informal provision of cooperation: The case of the Russian Skoptsy sect

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  • Maltsev, Vladimir

Abstract

The article examines the effects of voluntary religious castration (VRC) on the informal provision of cooperation through boycott. To do so, it analyzes the Russian Skoptsy sect, active from 1772 to 1930. The Skoptsy were outlawed by the Russian state and had to secure cooperation through informal means. To do so, the sect relied on the threat of boycott against noncooperative individuals. I argue that VRC ensured the credibility of this threat. First, VRC created a high entry cost, which screened for single-minded and patient individuals who placed high value upon repeated in-group interaction. Second, VRC created a high exit cost from the sect because of the hostile attitude of the Russian populace to castrated individuals. Moreover, the public could cheaply identify the ex-sect members and punish them because of permanent physiological changes caused by VRC. The credible threat of ostracism secured widespread cooperation among the Skoptsy and enabled the sect to support its members through a system of mutual aid and inheritance. Cooperation in the sect also allowed for a rapid creation of wealth through market collusion, making the Skoptsy one of the richest sects in Russia and abroad.

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  • Maltsev, Vladimir, 2022. "Economic effects of voluntary religious castration on the informal provision of cooperation: The case of the Russian Skoptsy sect," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:145:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122000526
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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