IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v144y2022ics0014292122000319.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolution of a dealer trading network and its effects on art auction prices

Author

Listed:
  • De Silva, Dakshina G.
  • Gertsberg, Marina
  • Kosmopoulou, Georgia
  • Pownall, Rachel A.J.

Abstract

We use a unique historical data set (1741-1913) of all London-based art auctions to capture the role of information acquisition in the development of a trading network for dealers and its effect on artwork prices. We explore how the network size, depth of interactions, and similarities in art specialization between trading partners influence the decision to form new links. We find that, a larger and deeper trading network exacerbates informational asymmetries among buyers, leading to a price advantage. We show that information transmission through a network of experienced dealers is important in determining the price they pay - a factor that has been overlooked so far in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • De Silva, Dakshina G. & Gertsberg, Marina & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pownall, Rachel A.J., 2022. "Evolution of a dealer trading network and its effects on art auction prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:144:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122000319
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104083
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292122000319
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104083?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Victor Ginsburgh & Jan C. van Ours, 2007. "On organizing a sequential auction: results from a natural experiment by Christie's," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 1-15, January.
    2. Ana Babus & Péter Kondor, 2018. "Trading and Information Diffusion in Over‐the‐Counter Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1727-1769, September.
    3. Hong, Han & Shum, Matthew, 2003. "Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 327-358, February.
    4. Dakshina Garfield De Silva & Marina Gertsberg & Rachel Pownall, 2016. "Market Evolution, Bidding Strategies, and Survival of Art Dealers," Working Papers 138739557, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    5. George Deltas & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2004. "'Catalogue' vs 'Order-of-sale' effects in sequential auctions: theory and evidence from a rare book sale," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 28-54, January.
    6. Gai, Prasanna & Kapadia, Sujit, 2010. "Contagion in financial networks," Bank of England working papers 383, Bank of England.
    7. Paolo Colla & Antonio Mele, 2010. "Information Linkages and Correlated Trading," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(1), pages 203-246, January.
    8. Michael Hutter & Christian Knebel & Gunnar Pietzner & Maren Schäfer, 2007. "Two games in town: a comparison of dealer and auction prices in contemporary visual arts markets," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 31(4), pages 247-261, December.
    9. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    10. Victor A. Ginsburgh, 1998. "Absentee Bidders and the Declining Price Anomaly in Wine Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1302-1331, December.
    11. Tong Li & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2009. "Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1397-1429.
    12. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2000. "Financial Contagion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 1-33, February.
    13. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    14. Dean Karlan & Markus Mobius & Tanya Rosenblat & Adam Szeidl, 2009. "Trust and Social Collateral," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(3), pages 1307-1361.
    15. Ozsoylev, Han N. & Walden, Johan, 2011. "Asset pricing in large information networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2252-2280.
    16. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
    17. Sergio Currarini & Matthew O. Jackson & Paolo Pin, 2009. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1003-1045, July.
    18. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Leister, C. Matthew, 2018. "Trading Networks and Equilibrium Intermediation," Working Paper Series rwp18-001, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    19. Matthew O. Jackson & Brian W. Rogers & Yves Zenou, 2017. "The Economic Consequences of Social-Network Structure," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 49-95, March.
    20. Yannis M. Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, 2004. "Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1056-1093, December.
    21. Douglas Hodgson & Keith Vorkink, 2004. "Asset pricing theory and the valuation of Canadian paintings," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(3), pages 629-655, August.
    22. Chanel, O. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1996. "Auction Theory and Practice Evidence from the Market for Jewellery," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 96b05, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    23. Sanjeev Goyal & Marco J. van der Leij & José Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, 2006. "Economics: An Emerging Small World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 403-432, April.
    24. Han N. Ozsoylev & Johan Walden & M. Deniz Yavuz & Recep Bildik, 2014. "Investor Networks in the Stock Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(5), pages 1323-1366.
    25. Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 433-440.
    26. Iori, Giulia & Mantegna, Rosario N. & Marotta, Luca & Miccichè, Salvatore & Porter, James & Tumminello, Michele, 2015. "Networked relationships in the e-MID interbank market: A trading model with memory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 98-116.
    27. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-883, December.
    28. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2000. "Networks versus Vertical Integration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 570-601, Autumn.
    29. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J., 1983. "Competitive bidding and proprietary information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 161-169, April.
    30. Ana Babus, 2016. "The formation of financial networks," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(2), pages 239-272, May.
    31. Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2003. "Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(1), pages 115-145.
    32. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    33. Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, 2003. "Auctions and the Price of Art," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 763-787, September.
    34. Rosen, Sherwin, 1974. "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 34-55, Jan.-Feb..
    35. Douglas J. Hodgson & Keith P. Vorkink, 2004. "Asset pricing theory and the valuation of Canadian paintings," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 629-655, August.
    36. Lux, Thomas, 2015. "Emergence of a core-periphery structure in a simple dynamic model of the interbank market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 11-23.
    37. Cocco, João F. & Gomes, Francisco J. & Martins, Nuno C., 2009. "Lending relationships in the interbank market," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 24-48, January.
    38. Furfine, Craig H, 2003. "Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(1), pages 111-128, February.
    39. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pownall, Rachel & Press, Robert, 2023. "Surviving in the marketplace: The importance of network connectivity for art dealers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    2. Etro, Federico & Stepanova, Elena, 2021. "Art return rates from old master paintings to contemporary art," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 94-116.
    3. Mingyuan Chen & Dakshina De Silva & Aurelie Slechten, 2021. "Director appointments, boardroom networks, and firm environmental performance," Working Papers 332157256, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dakshina Garfield De Silva & Marina Gertsberg & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Rachel Pownall, 2017. "Dealer Networks in the World of Art," Working Papers 198144199, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    2. in 't Veld, Daan & van der Leij, Marco & Hommes, Cars, 2020. "The formation of a core-periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    3. Goyal, S., 2016. "Networks and Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1652, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Maryam Farboodi, 2014. "Intermediation and Voluntary Exposure to Counterparty Risk," 2014 Meeting Papers 365, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Sofia Priazhkina & Samuel Palmer & Pablo Martín-Ramiro & Román Orús & Samuel Mugel & Vladimir Skavysh, 2024. "Digital Payments in Firm Networks: Theory of Adoption and Quantum Algorithm," Staff Working Papers 24-17, Bank of Canada.
    6. Sanjeev Goyal, 2015. "Networks in Economics: A Perspective on the Literature," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1548, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Caterina Liberati & Massimiliano Marzo & Paolo Zagaglia & Paola Zappa, 2015. "Drivers of demand and supply in the Euro interbank market: the role of “Key Players” during the recent turmoil," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 29(3), pages 207-250, August.
    8. Georges Dionne & Mélissa La Haye & Anne-Sophie Bergerès, 2015. "Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(3), pages 819-852, August.
    9. Ginsburgh, V. & van Ours, J.C., 2003. "How to Organize Sequential Auctions : Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's," Discussion Paper 2003-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Bryan S. Graham, 2019. "Network Data," Papers 1912.06346, arXiv.org.
    11. Choi, Syngjoo & Guerra, José-Alberto & Kim, Jinwoo, 2019. "Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 218-237.
    12. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
    13. Bryan S. Graham, 2019. "Network Data," CeMMAP working papers CWP71/19, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    14. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
    15. Olivier Chanel & Stéphanie Vincent, 2004. "Computing price trends in sequential auctions," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(4), pages 443-460.
    16. in 't Veld, Daan & van der Leij, Marco & Hommes, Cars, 2020. "The formation of a core-periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    17. Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Robert Townsend & Juan Pablo Xandri, 2018. "Financial Centrality and Liquidity Provision," NBER Working Papers 24406, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Ladley, Daniel, 2013. "Contagion and risk-sharing on the inter-bank market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 1384-1400.
    19. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11376, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2002. "Identification of Standard Auction Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2107-2140, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Art dealers; Trading networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:144:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122000319. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.