IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v50y2005i2p166-180.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stakeholders in bilateral conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Manzini, Paola
  • Ponsati, Clara

Abstract

The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing negotiations in such situations ought to account for the role and interests of the stakeholder - a third party whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. In this paper we address the strategic role of stakeholders in bilateral confrontations that take the form of a war of attrition; we assume that the bilateral confrontation runs concurrently with the parties interaction with the stakeholder, that chooses strategically her timing to intervene and take action to promote agreement. We show that under complete information the interplay of different interests in this tripartite timing game results in delayed outcomes. We also explore the role of incomplete information and show that asymmetries of information do not necessarily translate in increased inefficiency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Manzini, Paola & Ponsati, Clara, 2005. "Stakeholders in bilateral conflict," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 166-180, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:166-180
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(05)00044-2
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manzini, Paola & Ponsatí, Clara, 2001. "Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes," IZA Discussion Papers 395, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-1335, November.
    3. Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, 2000. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 85-118, January.
    4. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1995. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(4), pages 619-637.
    5. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    6. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March.
    7. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    8. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Hendricks, Ken & Weiss, Andrew & Wilson, Charles A, 1988. "The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(4), pages 663-680, November.
    10. Ponsati C. & Sakovics, J., 1996. "The war of attrition with incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 54-54, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
    2. P. Manzini & C. Ponsati, 2006. "Stakeholder bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 67-77, April.
    3. Hanato, Shunsuke, 2019. "Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 361-379.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
    2. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2022. "Engaging in Wars of Attrition," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 147, pages 79-100.
    3. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
    5. Shingo Ishiguro, 2010. "Holdup, search, and inefficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 307-338, August.
    6. Harstad, Bård, 2016. "The market for conservation and other hostages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 124-151.
    7. LaCasse, Chantale & Ponsati, Clara & Barham, Vicky, 2002. "Chores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 237-281, May.
    8. Georgiadis, George & Kim, Youngsoo & Kwon, H. Dharma, 2022. "The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 171-185.
    9. Li, Hongcheng, 2019. "Multi-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 109511, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Aug 2021.
    10. Randolph Sloof, 2005. "Finite Horizon Bargaining With Outside Options And Threat Points," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 109-142, March.
    11. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Reinterpreting the meaning of breakdown," Game Theory and Information 0501004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Metzger, Lars Peter, 2014. "Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 160-166.
    13. Wait, A., 2001. "Delays in Bargaining With Incompelete Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 809, The University of Melbourne.
    14. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    15. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
    16. George Georgiadis & Youngsoo Kim & H. Dharma Kwon, 2021. "The Absence of Attrition in a War of Attrition under Complete Information," Papers 2110.12013, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    17. Brown, Alexander L. & Van Essen, Matt, 2022. "Breaking-up should not be hard to do! Designing contracts to avoid wars of attrition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    18. Weng, Xi, 2015. "Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 49-62.
    19. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2005. "Alliances and negotiations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 128-141, March.
    20. Johannes Münster & Markus Reisinger, 2021. "Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 096, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:166-180. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.