Promotion careers with multiple punitive assignments
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References listed on IDEAS
- Pier Angelo Mori, 1998. "Task Shifts vs. Termination as Devices for Eliciting Optimal Effort Supply," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 33-65, March.
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- Fairburn, James A. & Malcomson, James M., 1994. "Rewarding performance by promotion to a different job," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 683-690, April.
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