IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v40y1992i4p473-480.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Appelbaum, Elie
  • Weber, Shlomo

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Appelbaum, Elie & Weber, Shlomo, 1992. "A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 473-480, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:40:y:1992:i:4:p:473-480
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0165-1765(92)90146-P
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Persson, Lars, 2004. "Predation and mergers: Is merger law counterproductive?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 239-258, April.
    2. Church, Jeffrey & Ware, Roger, 1996. "Delegation, market share and the limit price in sequential entry models," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 575-609, July.
    3. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2003. "Firm Location Choice in the Presence of a Free Rider Problem," Working Papers 2003_6, York University, Department of Economics.
    4. Paul Belleflamme, 2002. "Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying," Working Papers 463, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    5. Dan Kovenock & Suddhasatwa Roy, 2005. "Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 119-137, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2007. "Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 31-40, October.
    2. Persson, Lars, 2004. "Predation and mergers: Is merger law counterproductive?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 239-258, April.
    3. Dan Kovenock & Suddhasatwa Roy, 2005. "Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 119-137, July.
    4. Cumbul, Eray & Virág, Gábor, 2018. "Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 250-273.
    5. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2017. "Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 86-102.
    6. Church, Jeffrey & Ware, Roger, 1996. "Delegation, market share and the limit price in sequential entry models," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 575-609, July.
    7. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2003. "Firm Location Choice in the Presence of a Free Rider Problem," Working Papers 2003_6, York University, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cumbul, Eray & Virág, Gábor, 2018. "Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 250-273.
    2. Lars Persson, 2005. "The Failing Firm Defense," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 175-201, June.
    3. Zhao, Kai & Wu, Wanshu, 2015. "Ambiguity Between Pirate Incentive And Collective Desirability Within Semi-Delegation Pattern," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 56(2), pages 259-279, December.
    4. Georg Götz, 2002. "Spatial Competition, Sequential Entry, and Technology choice," Vienna Economics Papers 0215, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    5. Rupayan Pal, 2010. "Cooperative Managerial Delegation, R&D And Collusion," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 155-169, April.
    6. Felix Höffler, 2008. "On the consistent use of linear demand systems if not all varieties are available," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(14), pages 1-5.
    7. Rupayan Pal, 2012. "Delegation And Emission Tax In A Differentiated Oligopoly," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 80(6), pages 650-670, December.
    8. Michael Funk & Christian Jaag, 2018. "The More Economic Approach To Predatory Pricing," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 292-310.
    9. Rahim, Afaf H. & Ierland, Ekko C. van & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2010. "Competition in the gum arabic market: a game theoretic modelling approach," Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, Humboldt-Universitaat zu Berlin, vol. 49(1), pages 1-24.
    10. Motta, Massimo & Persson, Lars & Fumagalli, Chiara, 2005. "Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4902, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. repec:zbw:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201511261452 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Trishita Bhattacharjee & Rupayan Pal, 2013. "Managerial delegation in monopoly under network effects," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-009, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    13. Mason, Robin & Weeds, Helen, 2013. "Merger policy, entry, and entrepreneurship," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-38.
    14. Arun Sundararajan, 2003. "Managing Digital Piracy: Pricing, Protection and Welfare," Law and Economics 0307001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Rasch, Alexander & Wenzel, Tobias, 2013. "Piracy in a two-sided software market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 78-89.
    16. Persson, Lars & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, 2007. "Globalization and Profitability of Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6102, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Ahn, Illtae & Shin, Ilsoon, 2010. "On the optimal level of protection in DRM," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 341-353, December.
    18. Ralph M. Braid, 2016. "Potential merger-forcing entry reduces maximum spacing between firms in spatial competition," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(3), pages 653-669, August.
    19. Pehr-Johan Norbäck & Lars Persson, 2008. "Globalization and profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 241-266, May.
    20. Gopal Das Varma & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2010. "Non‐Cooperative Entry Deterrence In License Auctions: Dynamic Versus Sealed Bid," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 450-476, June.
    21. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:40:y:1992:i:4:p:473-480. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.