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Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products

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  • Dan Kovenock
  • Suddhasatwa Roy

Abstract

We examine free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the Gilbert and Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that for products that are differentiated enough, when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria coexist, the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium may Pareto dominate the entry equilibrium. Hence, “coordination failure” underinvestment in entry prevention can occur. However, as claimed, the overinvestment result of Gilbert and Vives remains robust to moderate amounts of product differentiation. We also show that coordination failure underinvestment arises in a wide variety of entry deterrence models and does not rely on assumptions regarding strategic substitutability or complementarity of precommitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Kovenock & Suddhasatwa Roy, 2005. "Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 119-137, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:72:y:2005:i:1:p:119-137
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2005.tb00691.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(2), pages 301-310.
    2. Dan Kovenock & Raymond Deneckere & Tom Faith & Beth Allen, 2000. "Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 501-530.
    3. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Information and competitive advantage," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 17-35.
    4. Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Sequential entry, industry structure and welfare," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1671-1687, October.
    5. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1984. "Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, Spring.
    6. Appelbaum, Elie & Weber, Shlomo, 1992. "A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 473-480, December.
    7. Richard Gilbert & Xavier Vives, 1986. "Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 71-83.
    8. Michael Waldman, 1991. "The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 446-453, Autumn.
    9. Vives, Xavier, 1985. "On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 166-175, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mariotto, Carlotta & Verdier, Marianne, 2015. "Innovation and competition in Internet and mobile banking: an industrial organization perspective," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 23/2015, Bank of Finland.

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