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Charitable giving for cultural goods: Asymmetric gender responses to votes on tax increases

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  • McCannon, Bryan C.
  • Ferreira Neto, Amir B.

Abstract

We examine the relationship between taxpayer support of cultural goods and charitable donations. Using a Dictator Game, subjects are paired with a real library as the recipient. Using outcomes from recent votes to increase property taxes to support local public libraries, we find a striking gender discrepancy. While slight reductions arise for both when the vote passes, female subjects increase their giving substantially in response to the ballot measure’s failure. This effect is driven by women donating all of their endowment more frequently.

Suggested Citation

  • McCannon, Bryan C. & Ferreira Neto, Amir B., 2021. "Charitable giving for cultural goods: Asymmetric gender responses to votes on tax increases," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:204:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521001567
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109879
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October.
    2. Amir Borges Ferreira Neto, 2018. "Charity and public libraries: Does government funding crowd out donations?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 42(4), pages 525-542, November.
    3. James Andreoni & Lise Vesterlund, 2001. "Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(1), pages 293-312.
    4. Okten, Cagla & Weisbrod, Burton A., 2000. "Determinants of donations in private nonprofit markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 255-272, February.
    5. Li, Sherry Xin & Eckel, Catherine & Grossman, Philip J. & Brown, Tara Larson, 2015. "Directed giving enhances voluntary giving to government," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 51-54.
    6. Andreoni, James, 1993. "An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1317-1327, December.
    7. Catherine C. Eckel & Benjamin A. Priday & Rick K. Wilson, 2018. "Charity Begins at Home: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment on Charitable Giving," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-22, November.
    8. Werfel, Seth H., 2018. "Does charitable giving crowd out support for government spending?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 83-86.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Charity; Dictator Game; Experiment; Library; Tax; Vote;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
    • C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other

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