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Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output

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  • Tillmann, Peter

Abstract

Central banks face uncertainty about potential output. We model optimal monetary policy under discretion in a situation in which the central bank adopts a min–max approach to policy. The case for appointing a conservative central banker who puts a larger weight on inflation stabilization becomes stronger as the central bank’s concern about misspecifications increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Tillmann, Peter, 2014. "Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 244-247.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:244-247
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Leitemo, Kai & Söderström, Ulf, 2008. "Robust Monetary Policy In The New Keynesian Framework," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(S1), pages 126-135, April.
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    4. Hans, Erwin & Wullink, Gerhard & van Houdenhoven, Mark & Kazemier, Geert, 2008. "Robust surgery loading," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 185(3), pages 1038-1050, March.
    5. Sorge, Marco M., 2013. "Robust delegation with uncertain monetary policy preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 73-78.
    6. Kevin J. Lansing, 2000. "Learning about a shift in trend output: implications for monetary policy and inflation," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    7. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 2005. "Endogenous monetary policy with unobserved potential output," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1951-1983, November.
    8. Ehrmann, Michael & Smets, Frank, 2003. "Uncertain potential output: implications for monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1611-1638, July.
    9. Timothy Cogley & Riccardo Colacito & Lars Peter Hansen & Thomas J. Sargent, 2008. "Robustness and U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(8), pages 1599-1623, December.
    10. Li-Lin Ku & Chien-Pai Han, 2008. "Robust testing procedures of process locations," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 42(5), pages 579-595, October.
    11. Tillmann, Peter, 2009. "The stabilization bias and robust monetary policy delegation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 730-734, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Oros, Cornel & Zimmer, Blandine, 2020. "Budget uncertainty in a monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. André Marine Charlotte & Dai Meixing, 2018. "Learning, robust monetary policy and the merit of precaution," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-20, June.
    3. André Marine Charlotte & Medina Espidio Sebastián, 2022. "Optimal Robust Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy," Working Papers 2022-17, Banco de México.
    4. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2015. "Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 259-278, April.
    5. Tillmann Peter, 2021. "Robust Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty About the Lower Bound," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(1), pages 309-321, January.
    6. Adriana Grasso & Guido Traficante, 2021. "Optimal robust monetary policy with parameters and output gap uncertainty," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1339, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    7. Marine Charlotte André & Meixing Dai, 2018. "The limits to robust monetary policy in a small open economy with learning agents," Working Papers of BETA 2018-45, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    8. Cornel OROS & Blandine ZIMMER, 2019. "Myopic governments and conservative central banks: are they compatible?," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2019-06, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    9. Li Qin & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2016. "Robustness of Optimal Interest Rate Rules in an Open Economy," Bulletin of Applied Economics, Risk Market Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 29-46.
    10. Edilean Kleber da Silva Bejarano Aragón, 2021. "Specification errors, nonlinearities, and structural breaks in the Central Bank of Brazil’s reaction function," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 1221-1243, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy; Potential output; Robust control; Knightian uncertainty; Monetary delegation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation

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