Sorting, incentives and risk preferences: Evidence from a field experiment
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- Bellemare, Charles & Shearer, Bruce S., 2006. "Sorting, Incentives and Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2227, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Charles Bellemare & Bruce S. Shearer, 2006. "Sorting, Incentives and Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Cahiers de recherche 0631, CIRPEE.
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More about this item
Keywords
Risk aversion Sorting Incentive contracts Field experiments;JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
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