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Policy bargains and the problem of model selection

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  • Hallett, A. J. Hughes

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  • Hallett, A. J. Hughes, 1995. "Policy bargains and the problem of model selection," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 941-959.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:19:y:1995:i:5-7:p:941-959
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sachs, Jeffrey, 1986. "The Uneasy Case for Greater Exchange Rate Coordination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 336-341, May.
    2. Gerald Holtham & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 1987. "International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty," International Economic Association Series, in: Ralph C. Bryant & Richard Portes (ed.), Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, chapter 5, pages 128-184, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Holtham, Gerald & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1992. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1043-1051, September.
    4. Jeffrey A. Frankel., 1991. "A Note on Internationally Coordinated Policy Packages Intended to Be Robust Under Model Uncertainty or Policy Cooperation Under Uncertainty: The Case for Some Disappointment," Economics Working Papers 91-167, University of California at Berkeley.
    5. Ghosh, Atish R & Masson, Paul R, 1991. "Model Uncertainty, Learning, and the Gains from Coordination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 465-479, June.
    6. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rockett, Katharine E, 1988. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 318-340, June.
    7. Hallett, A.J. Hughes, 1986. "International policy design and the sustainability of policy bargains," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 467-494, December.
    8. Ralph C. Bryant & Richard Portes (ed.), 1987. "Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-18916-8, June.
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