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European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation

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  • Eichengreen, Barry
  • Ghironi, Fabio

Abstract

In this paper we describe some of the opportunities and perils for international monetary cooperation associated with EMU. Our approach brings together two strands in the literature; one concerned with institutions, the other focusing on policy consensus. Previous work on the subject has featured both perspectives. Our contribution is to show how they fit together.

Suggested Citation

  • Eichengreen, Barry & Ghironi, Fabio, 1997. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt10d518tg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt10d518tg
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen von Hagen., 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-056, University of California at Berkeley.
    2. Kenen,Peter B., 1995. "Economic and Monetary Union in Europe," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521558839, July.
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    4. Haas, Peter M., 1992. "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-35, January.
    5. Peter B.. Kenen, 1990. "The Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies," NBER Chapters, in: International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations, pages 63-108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Gerald Holtham & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 1987. "International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty," International Economic Association Series, in: Ralph C. Bryant & Richard Portes (ed.), Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, chapter 5, pages 128-184, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap talk can matter in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 221-237, June.
    8. Goldstein, Judith, 1988. "Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 179-217, January.
    9. C. Randall Henning, 1994. "Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 15, April.
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    11. William H. Branson & Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein, 1990. "International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bran90-1, June.
    12. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rockett, Katharine E, 1988. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 318-340, June.
    13. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1990. "Obstacles to Coordination, and a Consideration of Two Proposals to Overcome Them: International Nominal Targeting (INT) and the Hosomi Fund," NBER Chapters, in: International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations, pages 109-158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Morrow, James D., 1994. "Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 387-423, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EMU; international finance; monetary cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade

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