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International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty

In: Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Gerald Holtham

    (Brookings Institution)

  • Andrew Hughes Hallett

    (University of Newcastle Upon Tyne
    CEPR)

Abstract

Since the work of Hamada (1974, 1976) a prima facie case has been established for the international coordination of macroeconomic policy. In a world where policies have spill-over effects on other economies, and in which governments have more policy targets than instruments, independent policy-making is generally sub-optimal; cooperation is required to reach a Pare to optimum. One obvious way in which policy changes in one country can impose externalities on another is through exchange rate movements.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald Holtham & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 1987. "International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty," International Economic Association Series, in: Ralph C. Bryant & Richard Portes (ed.), Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, chapter 5, pages 128-184, Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-18916-8_5
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18916-8_5
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    Cited by:

    1. Barry Eichengreen and Fabio Ghironi., 1997. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-091, University of California at Berkeley.
    2. Hallett, A. J. Hughes, 1995. "Policy bargains and the problem of model selection," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 941-959.
    3. Mr. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Mr. Xavier Debrun & Mr. Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IMF Working Papers 2001/178, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Patrick Artus, 1992. "Passage à l'union économique et monétaire en Europe : effets sur la croissance et les politiques budgétaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 106(5), pages 123-137.
    5. Carlo Carraro, 1997. "Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 163-177, October.
    6. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Hali J. Edison, 1990. "A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 399-435.
    7. Yiyong Cai & Warwick McKibbin, 2015. "Uncertainty and International Climate Change Negotiations," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 1(1), pages 101-115, March.
    8. Frankel, Jeffrey A., 1988. "Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3-4), pages 353-374, July.
    9. Thomas Willett, 1999. "Developments in the Political Economy of Policy Coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 221-253, May.
    10. A.J. Hallet, 1998. "When Do Target Zones Work? An Examination of Exchange Rate Targeting as a Device for Coordinating Economic Policies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-138, April.
    11. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1990. "Obstacles to Coordination, and a Consideration of Two Proposals to Overcome Them: International Nominal Targeting (INT) and the Hosomi Fund," NBER Chapters, in: International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations, pages 109-158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Jeffrey Frankel & Scott Erwin & Katharine Rockett, 1991. "A Note on Internationally Coordinated Policy Packages Intended to be Robust Under Model Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 3747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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