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Model Uncertainty, Learning, and the Gains from Coordination

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  • Ghosh, Atish R
  • Masson, Paul R

Abstract

This paper considers gains from international economic policy coordination when there is uncertainty concerning the functioning of the world economy, but also learning about the "true" model on the part of policymakers. The paper reports estimates of plausible alternative versions of a standard two-country model. Activist policy (either coordinated or uncoordinated) may produce large welfare losses in the absence of learning, if policymakers behave in the wrong model; hence, exogenous money targets and freely flexible exchange rates may be best. However, model learning (from observations on macroeconomic variables) causes coordinated policies to dominate activist uncoordinated policies or exogenous money targets. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.

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  • Ghosh, Atish R & Masson, Paul R, 1991. "Model Uncertainty, Learning, and the Gains from Coordination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 465-479, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:3:p:465-79
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    Cited by:

    1. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Ghosh, Atish R., 2016. "On the obstacles to international policy coordination," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 25-40.
    2. Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2013. "The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 29-43.
    3. McCallum, Bennett T & Nelson, Edward, 1999. "An Optimizing IS-LM Specification for Monetary Policy and Business Cycle Analysis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 296-316, August.
    4. David Alan Aschauer, 1997. "Skiki vono ko shtuvalo? The Seignorage Loss from Monetary Stabilization in Ukraine," Macroeconomics 9712005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July.
    6. Hallett, A. J. Hughes, 1995. "Policy bargains and the problem of model selection," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 941-959.
    7. Chen, William & Phelan, Gregory, 2021. "International coordination of macroprudential policies with capital flows and financial asymmetries," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    8. Mr. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Mr. Xavier Debrun & Mr. Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IMF Working Papers 2001/178, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Douven, Rudy & Peeters, Marga, 1998. "GDP-spillovers in multi-country models," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 163-195, April.
    10. Guender, Alfred V. & Tam, Julie, 2004. "On the performance of nominal income targeting as a strategy for monetary policy in a small open economy," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 143-163, March.
    11. Thomas Willett, 1999. "Developments in the Political Economy of Policy Coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 221-253, May.
    12. Tan, Kang Yong & Tanaka, Misa, 2008. "International monetary co-operation in a world of imperfect information," Bank of England working papers 344, Bank of England.
    13. Paul Conway, 2000. "Monetary policy in an uncertain world," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 63, September.
    14. Ellison, Martin & Sarno, Lucio & Vilmunen, Jouko, 2007. "Caution Or Activism? Monetary Policy Strategies In An Open Economy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(4), pages 519-541, September.
    15. repec:bla:reviec:v:8:y:2000:i:4:p:721-40 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Ghosh, Atish R., 2002. "Central bank secrecy in the foreign exchange market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 253-272, February.
    17. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1997. "Structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1709-1733, December.
    18. Dean Corbae & Christopher J. Neely & Paul A. Weller, 1998. "Endogenous realignments and the sustainability of a target," Working Papers 1994-009, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    19. Ha, Yuong, 1999. "Uncertainty about Length of the Monetary Policy Transmission Lag: Implications for Monetary Policy," Working Paper Series 94, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    20. Peter Mooslechner & Martin Schuerz, 1999. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: Any Lessons for EMU? A Selective Survey of the Literature," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 171-199, September.
    21. Swank, Otto H., 1998. "Towards an economic theory of party ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 223-240, May.
    22. Bastiaan Verhoef, 2006. "Pricing-to-market, sectoral shocks and gains from monetary cooperation," DNB Working Papers 110, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.

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