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A paper tiger? An empirical analysis of majority voting

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  • Cai, Jay
  • Garner, Jacqueline L.
  • Walkling, Ralph A.

Abstract

Majority voting in board elections has emerged as a dominant theme in recent proxy seasons. Analysis of majority voting is important: first, the impact is controversial yet scant empirical evidence exists. Second, Congress is still considering mandating this practice. Third, there has been a tectonic shift in adoptions of majority voting, from 16% to over 67% of S&P 500 firms in just two years. Fourth, the vast majority of shareholder proposals for majority voting are sponsored by unions with little shareholdings. Proponents argue that majority voting aligns shareholder–director interests. Opponents argue that the practice will be disruptive and could result in the failure of boards to meet exchange and SEC requirements. Others assert that majority voting is a paper tiger, amounting to form over substance, particularly since many adoptions are non-binding. We provide an empirical analysis of the wealth effects, characteristics, and efficacy of majority voting. Our results are consistent with the paper tiger hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Cai, Jay & Garner, Jacqueline L. & Walkling, Ralph A., 2013. "A paper tiger? An empirical analysis of majority voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 119-135.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:21:y:2013:i:c:p:119-135
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.01.002
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    Cited by:

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    2. Gow, Ian D. & Larcker, David F. & Watts, Edward M., 2023. "Board diversity and shareholder voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    3. Cuñat, Vicente & Lu, Yiqing & Wu, Hong, 2021. "Managerial response to shareholder empowerment: evidence from majority- voting legislation changes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118896, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Ghafoor, Abdul & Zhichuan, Frank Li & Yousaf, Imran, 2024. "Co-opted Boards and Corporate Cash Holdings," CAFE Working Papers 27, Centre for Accountancy, Finance and Economics (CAFE), Birmingham City Business School, Birmingham City University.
    5. Yonca Ertimur & Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, 2018. "Understanding Uncontested Director Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(7), pages 3400-3420, July.
    6. Ertugrul, Mine & Marciukaityte, Dalia, 2021. "Labor unions and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    7. Ning Cai & Wen He & Guoqiang Wu & Xin Yu, 2024. "Online voting and minority shareholder dissent: Evidence from China," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 327-352, June.
    8. Chung, Kee H. & Lee, Choonsik, 2020. "Voting methods for director election, monitoring costs, and institutional ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    9. Ashraf, Rasha & Li, Huimin & Ryan, Harley E., 2020. "Dual agency problems in family firms: Evidence from director elections," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
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    11. Steve Sauerwald & J. (Hans) Van Oosterhout & Marc Van Essen, 2016. "Expressive Shareholder Democracy: A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Dissent in 15 Western European Countries," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 520-551, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Election of directors; Majority voting; Shareholder proposals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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