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Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth

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  • Mulherin, J. Harold
  • Poulsen, Annette B.

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  • Mulherin, J. Harold & Poulsen, Annette B., 1998. "Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 279-313, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:47:y:1998:i:3:p:279-313
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    8. Comment, Robert & Schwert, G. William, 1995. "Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 3-43, September.
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