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Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists

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  • Clifford, Christopher P.

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  • Clifford, Christopher P., 2008. "Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 323-336, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:14:y:2008:i:4:p:323-336
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