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Stability of the Cournot equilibrium for a Cournot oligopoly model with n competitors

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  • Lampart, Marek

Abstract

In this paper a Cournot-like model is constructed with an iso-elastic demand function for n competitors. The Cournot equilibrium is constructed for general constant unit costs. Finally, it is proved that for identical unit costs the Cournot point is a sink for two or three competitors and a saddle for more than four players.

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  • Lampart, Marek, 2012. "Stability of the Cournot equilibrium for a Cournot oligopoly model with n competitors," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1081-1085.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:45:y:2012:i:9:p:1081-1085
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2012.05.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tramontana, Fabio & Gardini, Laura & Puu, Tönu, 2010. "Global bifurcations in a piecewise-smooth Cournot duopoly game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 15-24.
    2. R. D. Theocharis, 1960. "On the Stability of the Cournot Solution on the Oligopoly Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 27(2), pages 133-134.
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    Cited by:

    1. Danca, Marius-F. & Lampart, Marek, 2021. "Hidden and self-excited attractors in a heterogeneous Cournot oligopoly model," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    2. Cavalli, Fausto & Naimzada, Ahmad, 2016. "Complex dynamics and multistability with increasing rationality in market games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 151-161.
    3. Akio Matsumoto & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 2020. "Delay Stability of n -Firm Cournot Oligopolies," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(9), pages 1-19, September.
    4. Fausto Cavalli & Ahmad Naimzada & Marina Pireddu, 2015. "Effects of Size, Composition, and Evolutionary Pressure in Heterogeneous Cournot Oligopolies with Best Response Decisional Mechanisms," Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Hindawi, vol. 2015, pages 1-17, May.
    5. Wang, Chun & Pi, Jinxiu & Zhou, Die & Tang, Wei & Yang, Guanghui, 2023. "Dynamics of n-person Cournot games with asymmetric information and heterogeneous expectations," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 618(C).
    6. Cavalli, Fausto & Naimzada, Ahmad & Pireddu, Marina, 2015. "Heterogeneity and the (de)stabilizing role of rationality," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 226-244.
    7. Marek Lampart & Alžběta Lampartová, 2020. "Chaos Control and Anti-Control of the Heterogeneous Cournot Oligopoly Model," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(10), pages 1-13, September.
    8. Luca Gori & Luca Guerrini & Mauro Sodini, 2017. "A characterisation of duopoly dynamics with frictions in production adjustments," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 27(5), pages 963-988, November.
    9. Wang, Chun & Tang, Wei & Pi, Jinxiu, 2024. "The stability of dynamic n-person Cournot games with strategic adjustment costs," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).

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