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An evolutionary Cournot model with limited market knowledge

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  • Bischi, Gian Italo
  • Lamantia, Fabio
  • Radi, Davide

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a dynamic game of Cournot competition with heterogeneous firms choosing between two different adaptive behavioral rules in deciding output strategies. The underlying oligopoly structure is standard: using a constant return to scale technology, N firms produce homogeneous goods, which are sold in a market characterized by constant price elasticity. In this setup, we assume that a fraction of firms employs a quite rough rule of thumb, the so-called Local Monopolistic Approximation (LMA), whereas the complementary fraction plays Best Reply (BR), a more demanding strategy in terms of information and computation requirements. The model is first considered with exogenously fixed fractions of firms in the two complementary groups. Then it is generalized by considering an endogenous evolutionary switching process between the two behavioral strategies based on profit-driven replicator dynamics. The role of the number of firms, information costs and inertia (or anchoring attitude) in production decisions is analyzed, as well as the influence in the evolutionary process of random noise in the demand function and memory of past profits. Global properties of the oligopoly with evolutionary pressure between behavioral rules are discussed, with particular regard to cases in which the Nash equilibrium is unstable.

Suggested Citation

  • Bischi, Gian Italo & Lamantia, Fabio & Radi, Davide, 2015. "An evolutionary Cournot model with limited market knowledge," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 219-238.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:116:y:2015:i:c:p:219-238
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.024
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oligopolies; Local Monopolistic Approximation; Evolutionary dynamics; Heterogeneous firms; Nonlinear phenomena;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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