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Asymmetric employer learning and gender-based statistical discrimination in China

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  • Sun, Qian

Abstract

We test if employers in China learn asymmetrically about worker's productivity and the implication on statistical discrimination against women. Using data from the 2018 survey of China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), we find evidence of asymmetric employer learning for non-college graduate workers. Furthermore, employers statistically discriminate against female workers without college education at time of hiring. This statistical discrimination against women does not decrease over time because asymmetric employer learning is found to occur mostly for men. In contrast, no evidence of employer learning or statistical discrimination against women is found for college graduate workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Sun, Qian, 2024. "Asymmetric employer learning and gender-based statistical discrimination in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:87:y:2024:i:c:s1043951x24001470
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102258
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Statistical discrimination; Employer learning; Asymmetric learning; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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