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Modelling central-local fiscal relations in China

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  • Ma, Jun

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  • Ma, Jun, 1995. "Modelling central-local fiscal relations in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 105-136.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:6:y:1995:i:1:p:105-136
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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Agarwala, R., 1992. "China: Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations," World Bank - Discussion Papers 178, World Bank.
    5. Mr. Michael W. Bell & Ms. Kalpana Kochhar & Hoe Ee Khor, 1993. "China at the Threshold of a Market Economy," IMF Occasional Papers 1993/006, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Bahl, Roy W. & Wallich, Christine, 1992. "Intergovernmental fiscal relations in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 863, The World Bank.
    7. Roger H. Gordon, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 567-586.
    8. Shah, Anwar, 1991. "Perspectives on the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 726, The World Bank.
    9. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    10. Jun Ma, 1995. "Macroeconomic management and intergovernmental relations in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1408, The World Bank.
    11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herschler, Stephen B., 1995. "The 1994 tax reforms: The center strikes back," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 239-245.
    2. Lili Kang & Fei Peng, 2018. "Economic Reform and Productivity Convergence in China," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 17(1), pages 50-82, June.
    3. Backhaus, Klaus & Buschken, Joachim, 1999. "The Paradox of Unsatisfying but Stable Relationships--A Look at German Car Suppliers," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 245-257, November.
    4. Caldeira, Emilie, 2012. "Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 878-897.
    5. Krug, B. & Zhu, Z. & Hendrischke, H., 2004. "China’s emerging tax regime: Devolution, fiscal federalism, or tax farming?," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2004-113-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    6. He, Qichun, 2015. "Fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution: Evidence from Chinese panel data," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 86-100.
    7. Meng, Tianguang & Su, Zheng, 2021. "When top-down meets bottom-up: Local officials and selective responsiveness within fiscal policymaking in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    8. Jun Ma, 1997. "Intergovernmental fiscal transfer in nine countries : lessons for developingcountries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1822, The World Bank.
    9. Yu, Xueying & Wang, Hongxia, 2013. "How should the center lead China's reforestation efforts?—Policy making games between central and local governments," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 64-84.
    10. Zhou, Mohan & Lin, Faqin & Li, Tan, 2016. "Remote markets as shelters for local distortions: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 241-253.
    11. Shih-Ying Wu & Mei-Jane Teng, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization and multinational firms’ ownership: evidence from China," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 237-262, September.
    12. Li, Xiaoming, 2000. "Reforming China's financial system and monetary policies: a sovereign remedy for locally initiated investment expansion?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 423-443, August.

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