Inflation targeting in the 1990s: the experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom
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- Brayton, Flint & Tinsley, P. A., 1996. "Effective interest rate policies for price stability," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 289-314, April.
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Keywords
Inflation (Finance); New Zealand; Canada; Great Britain;All these keywords.
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