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Strategy optimization for static games based on STP method

Author

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  • Wang, Liqing
  • Liu, Yang
  • Wu, Zhengguang
  • Alsaadi, Fuad E.

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the choice behavior of players in a static game and discuss solutions to static games of complete information problem via semi-tensor product (STP) method. Some properties of the dominant behaviors are obtained, based on which, choosing the dominant strategies deleting the dominated strategies are used to optimize the strategy sets so as to obtain solutions to the considered game. Examples are given to show the effectiveness of the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Liqing & Liu, Yang & Wu, Zhengguang & Alsaadi, Fuad E., 2018. "Strategy optimization for static games based on STP method," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 316(C), pages 390-399.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:316:y:2018:i:c:p:390-399
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2017.08.023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Chen, Hongwei & Wu, Bo & Lu, Jianquan, 2016. "A minimum-time control for Boolean control networks with impulsive disturbances," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 273(C), pages 477-483.
    3. Tobias Harks & Max Klimm, 2012. "On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(3), pages 419-436, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Aixin & Li, Haitao & Wang, Lin, 2024. "Exploring multi-potential games in strategic form: A graph theoretic approach," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 474(C).
    2. Mao, Ying & Wang, Liqing & Liu, Yang & Lu, Jianquan & Wang, Zhen, 2018. "Stabilization of evolutionary networked games with length-r information," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 337(C), pages 442-451.
    3. Li, Meilin & Lu, Jianquan & Lou, Jungang & Liu, Yang & Alsaadi, Fuad E., 2018. "The equivalence issue of two kinds of controllers in Boolean control networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 321(C), pages 633-640.
    4. Guo, Peilian & Han, Changda, 2021. "Nash equilibrium and group strategy consensus of networked evolutionary game with coupled social groups," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 409(C).
    5. Tong, Liyun & Liu, Yang & Lou, Jungang & Lu, Jianquan & Alsaadi, Fuad E., 2018. "Static output feedback set stabilization for context-sensitive probabilistic Boolean control networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 332(C), pages 263-275.

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