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The rise and fall of normative control

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  • Hechter, Michael

Abstract

Widely-publicized breaches of professional norms among accountants in the United States have kindled their interest in the problem of norms and normative control. This article discusses the current literature on norms. It suggests that normative control, which is always problematic, is especially so when agents are subject to the control of two or more principals having divergent interests. It is argued that the agent's compliance will tend to flow to that principal upon whom the agent is most dependent. The analysis is illustrated by the case of the rise and fall of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm.

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  • Hechter, Michael, 2008. "The rise and fall of normative control," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 663-676, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:33:y:2008:i:6:p:663-676
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Edgley, Carla & Sharma, Nina & Anderson-Gough, Fiona, 2016. "Diversity and professionalism in the Big Four firms: Expectation, celebration and weapon in the battle for talent," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 13-34.
    2. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Mawani, Amin & Shi, Guifeng & Zhou, Zejiang, 2020. "Impact of social capital on tone ambiguity in banks’ 10-K filings," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C).
    3. Monica Baraldi, 2008. "Control Systems for Banks in Global Markets," Symphonya. Emerging Issues in Management, Niccolò Cusano University, issue 2 Market-.
    4. Miley, Frances & Read, Andrew, 2021. "Soldiers don't go mad: Shell shock and accounting intransigence in the British Army 1914-18," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2).
    5. Liu, Yanju & Lu, Hai & Veenstra, Kevin, 2014. "Is sin always a sin? The interaction effect of social norms and financial incentives on market participants’ behavior," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 289-307.

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