Group contests and technologies
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Cited by:
- Send, Jonas, 2020. "Conflict between non-exclusive groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 858-874.
- Dongryul Lee & Pilwon Kim, 2022. "Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 39-68, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
Group contests; Public good; Technology;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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