Affirmative Action in Large Population Contests
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- Ratul Lahkar & Saptarshi Mukherjee, 2022. "Optimal Large Population Tullock Contests," Working Papers 82, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
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Keywords
Affirmative Action;NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2020-10-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-ISF-2020-10-12 (Islamic Finance)
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