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Are there timing effects in coordination game experiments?

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  • Tao Li

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

The timing effects (timing without observability) identified by Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004) in coordination game experiments are caused by their fixed-matching protocol. When we use a random-matching protocol the alleged timing effects completely vanish.

Suggested Citation

  • Tao Li, 2007. "Are there timing effects in coordination game experiments?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(13), pages 1-9.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c90001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June.
    2. Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer & Marc Knez, 2004. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(1), pages 25-48, February.
    3. Amershi, A.H. & Sadanand, A.B. & Sadanand, V., 1989. "Manipulated Nash Equilibria - Iii: Applications And A Preliminary Experiment," Working Papers 1989-6, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dai, Zhixin & Zheng, Jiwei & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2024. "Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Edward Cartwright & Joris Gillet & Mark Van Vugt, 2013. "Leadership By Example In The Weak-Link Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2028-2043, October.

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    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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