Are there timing effects in coordination game experiments?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer & Marc Knez, 2004.
"Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(1), pages 25-48, February.
- Camerer, Colin F. & Knez, Marc & Weber, Roberto A., 1996. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games," Working Papers 970, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June.
- Amershi, A.H. & Sadanand, A.B. & Sadanand, V., 1989. "Manipulated Nash Equilibria - Iii: Applications And A Preliminary Experiment," Working Papers 1989-6, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
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"Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample,"
China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- ZHIXIN Dai & Jiwei Zheng & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2020. "Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample," Working Papers 305138067, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
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- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
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