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Parties

Author

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  • Thomas Schwartz

    (UCLA)

Abstract

Here is a full statement of the theory of political parties as long coalitions, ones organized and elected to stick together on all or most legislative votes. The incentive to form, join, and elect them comes from the external cost of simple-majority voting—the central problem of The Calculus of Consent—but more fundamentally from the Paradox of Voting, or cycles of majority preference. I prove that a cycle among prospective legislative outcomes is sufficient for that incentive to be effective, and necessary too: without cycles there would be no parties. The identification of parties with long coalitions originated in a squib written years ago. The chief innovation of this paper is the proven cyclic basis of parties (and with it the absence of parties from one-dimensional voting bodies). Other innovations include extensions of the theory to minority parties, electoral parties, and subnational parties, a deeper explanation than Duvergers’ of two-party systems, and an explanation of how parties maintain their length and use it to prevent defection.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Schwartz, 2021. "Parties," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 462-475, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:32:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09326-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09326-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Riker, William H. & Brams, Steven J., 1973. "The Paradox of Vote Trading," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 1235-1247, December.
    2. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "A model of political parties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 250-277, April.
    3. Peter Bernholz, 1973. "Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 87-95, June.
    4. Baron, David P., 1993. "Government Formation and Endogenous Parties," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 34-47, March.
    5. Anthony Downs, 1961. "Problems of Majority Voting: In Defense of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(2), pages 192-192.
    6. Thomas Schwartz, 2011. "One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 197-214, July.
    7. Joseph Kadane, 1972. "On division of the question," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-54, September.
    8. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    9. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(6), pages 571-571.
    10. Peter Bernholz, 1974. "Logrolling, Arrow‐Paradox And Decision Rules ‐A Generalization ," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 49-62, January.
    11. Schwartz, Thomas, 1977. "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 999-1010, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Parties; Cycles; Legislatures; Elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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